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This special issue is the third in a four-part series, Health Care Through the ‘Lens of 
Risk’, which focus on risk categorisation, valuing, expecting and time-framing 
respectively, and published or to be published in 2012 and 2013. The present 
editorial introduces the issue of probabilistic thinking about health in relation to an 
interview-based article and five substantial research papers, with further papers to 
appear subsequently in an annex in the next issue of Health, Risk & Society.   
 




PROBABILISTIC THINKING AND HEALTH RISKS: AN EDITORIAL  
 
This editorial introduces the third of a series of four special issues, Health Care 
Through the ‘Lens of Risk’, which will be published in Health, Risk & Society in 2012 
and 2013. The series focuses on health risk-thinking, with its starting point the Royal 
Society Risk report (1992, p. 2, our numbering) definition of risk as: 
 
the probability (3) that a particular adverse (2) event (1) occurs during a stated 
period of time (4a), or results from a particular challenge (4b).  
 
The report framed the above definition as the grounding  for quantitative risk 
assessment, portrayed as ‘a powerful tool for investigation and reduction of risk’. The 
four special issues will each offer interpretivist critiques of one of the numbered 
elements flagged up in the Royal Society report definition, with events recast as 
categories, adversity as negative value, probabilities as uncertain expectations and 
time periods as time-frames (Heyman, Shaw, Alaszewski and Titterton, 2010, p. 21). 
Although the four identified elements of risk-thinking can be considered separately, 
their interdependence should not be lost sight of. Unless at least one out of a set of 
constructed outcome categories is valued negatively, a risk will not be identified. 
Probability estimation will be affected by the location of category boundaries, for 
instance if a broader or narrower definition of mental disorder is specified, and by 
time-framing, for example if three or five year post-intervention survival is 
considered.  
 
Probability plays a key role in risk-thinking, as the distinctive feature which 
differentiates the ‘lens of risk’ from other ways of considering what might happen 
such as fatalism or belief in divine will (Zinn, 2008). Its importance is expressed in 
the sentence following the Royal Society definition: 
 
As a probability in the sense of statistical theory risk obeys all the formal laws 
of combining probabilities. 
 
The uncharacteristic clumsiness of the follow-on statement in a generally fluent 
document perhaps indicates unarticulated unease about the assertion that 
probabilities can be appropriately analysed through rigorous mathematics. Hájek has 
offered a sceptical counterpoint: 
 
Once upon a time I was an undergraduate majoring in mathematics and 
statistics. I attended many lectures on probability theory, and my lecturers 
taught me many nice theorems involving probability … One day I approached 
them after a lecture and asked him … ‘What is probability?’ He looked at me 
like I needed medication, and he told me to go to the philosophy department. 
(2008, p.91, quoted author’s emphasis) 
 
Ironically, an aura of precision has been wrapped round a concept which is used to 
encode its opposite. Probability is only applied to outcomes which cannot be 
accurately foretold at the individual level, for instance in relation to survival after 
major surgery or the possible presence of a condition flagged up through screening. 
Furthermore, application of the mathematics of statistics requires the assumption to 
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be made that uncertainty can be recast as randomness. It will be argued below that 
the metaphor of randomness offers no more than the projection of uncertainty. 
 
Historians assert that the concept of probability was invented in seventeenth-century 
Western Europe (Bernstein, 1996; Hacking, 1975) and offered a crucial contribution 
to the development of science and technology which have transformed human 
societies and the natural world globally, for better and for worse. Probabilistic 
thinking provides a means of bringing empirical observational methods to bear on 
forecasting real-life outcomes which are too complex to be precisely predicted, and 
is particularly applicable to inexact ‘low sciences’ such as medicine (Hacking, 1975, 
p. 46). Social scientists who wish to understand the role of probabilistic thinking in 
health care are confronted by a voluminous, indigestible and, to most of us, largely 
abstruse body of historical debate which has attempted to answer Hájek’s question. 
It is tempting to avoid this issue as too difficult for non-mathematicians, and to 
assume that social scientists, along with the public, ‘are weak in probabilistic 
thinking’ (Douglas, 1992, p. 57). In relation to the four-ingredient definition of risk 
offered above, social scientists might consider probabilities, perhaps along with 
categorisation and time-framing, to belong to natural sciences, in contrast to valuing 
which can only be done by those whom a particular risk may affect (Heyman, 
Alaszewski and Brown, 2012). However, such a position would take for granted the 
epistemological status of scientific probabilistic reasoning, and puts ‘humans’, that is 
non-scientists, in an inferior position in which they ‘appear to fail miserably when it 
comes to rational decision-making’ about risks (Breakwell, 2007, p. 79). Although 
shortcomings of individuals in probabilistic reasoning have been well-documented, 
accepting  its objectivity uncritically legitimates a wide status gap between official 
science and the beliefs of ‘lay’ people, and, as Wynne (1996) argued, gives too 
much credit to the former and too little to the latter.  
 
Such claims to superiority would be justified if key assumptions underpinning the 
mathematics of probability, particularly randomness and independence of events, 
hold true unproblematically. However, as sketched out below, these presuppositions 
themselves provide no more than heuristics, simplifications which usefully offer 
partial glimpses of the future, but only at the price of deliberately accepting 
distortions which generate systematic errors. As also briefly illustrated below, 
patients sometimes appreciate the limitations inherent in probabilistic reasoning 
itself, and their responses to its inherent shortcomings matter clinically. Furthermore, 
well-documented rules of thumb used by ‘people’, the de-cultured representatives of  
human nature constructed in much main-stream psychology (Valsiner, 2012), for 
example viewing a more mentally available risk as also more probable, stand at one 
remove from the official probability heuristic. Such rules of thumb can therefore be 
viewed as heuristics about heuristics. This analytical move adds a further layer of 
complexity to social scientific consideration of health risk decision-making, but also 
slightly rescues ‘humans’ from the charge of incompetence vis a vis science, since 
the crudity in lay thought processes merely add another layer to the low forms of 
science which are forced to rely on probability assessment, faute de mieux. A 
deconstruction of probabilistic thinking is sketched out below. 
 




The starting point for analysing the attributes of probabilistic thinking should not be 
the concept itself, but rather the problem which it is designed to deal with. If it is 
accepted that probability was invented in seventeenth century Western Europe, then 
the question has to be addressed as to what, if anything, it began to at least partly 
replace. One way to locate probabilistic thinking in a wider historical and cultural 
framework is to consider it as a particular variant of thinking contingently (Heyman, 
2012). Contingency is perceived whenever an observer considers that one of two or 
more alternative outcomes might happen, or retrospectively, might have happened. 
Since, in nature, unique events merely take place, the view that alternatives could 
possibly occur can only originate in the mind. Furthermore, for social scientists who 
concern themselves with explaining organised social action, then the answer to the 
question ‘What might happen’ must be ‘Absolutely anything!’, including events which 
scientists consider impossible. If the Aztecs did carry out human sacrifices in order to 
appease the Sun God (Meyer, Sherman and Deeds, 2003), the ostensible rationale 
for doing so was to deal with a societally mobilising contingency, of the sun deciding 
not to rise unless appeased. As such examples illustrate, social groups organise 
themselves around  contingencies which concern them, but do not necessarily 
attempt to manage what might happen probabilistically. Gross and Shuval (2008, p. 
555) concluded from a study of Ultra-Orthodox Jews that their resistance to prenatal 
screening relates to its underpinning cosmological presupposition that the Universe 
is ultimately shaped by chance rather than God’s will (see also Green’s interview 
discussion of  accidents in this special issue). This analysis assumes that the 
capacity to imagine contingencies is a universal characteristic of ‘humans’, whereas 
both generic understandings of contingency and selections of concerns from the 
infinity of possibility are culturally mediated. 
 
Probabilistic thinking can be brought to bear on contingencies in various ways, all 
involving quantification of varying degrees of precision. Personal statements of the 
form ‘I am 90 per cent sure that I will do X tomorrow’ can only be tested directly via 
introspection, and cannot be falsified, although a history of non-delivery may invoke 
scepticism. With respect to rare or unique large-scale disasters such as the melt-
down of nuclear plants or human-caused catastrophic global warming, observation 
cannot be utilised in the estimation of probabilities which must rely on the inevitably 
conjectural process of modelling. (However the frequency of nuclear accidents, 
which modelling purported to show were vanishingly rare, is beginning to take them 
into the zone where inductive probability estimation becomes feasible.i) The 
complexity of health problems such as cancer or pregnancy complications precludes 
modelling in individual cases. However, in compensation, the frequency of most 
adverse health events allows their probabilities to be inductively estimated, both 
absolutely and in relation to identified potential risk factors.  
 
The rise of probabilistic thinking as a way of understanding and attempting to 
manage contingencies is associated with the development of science in Western 
Europe. Probability can be deconstructed as the projections of uncertain 
expectations onto the world via the metaphor of randomness. This formulation draws 
upon the philosophical Bayesian approach which views probabilities as expressions 
of degrees of knowledge limitations (Heyman, Henriksen and Maughan, 1998; 
Suppes, 1994)ii. It can best be demonstrated through examples which expose the 
non-literal status of randomness as an attribute of non-quantum events. Pregnant 
women who accept non-invasive but inaccurate screening tests for Down’s 
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syndrome are given ‘their’ probability, for example one chance in 100 of their baby 
having a chromosomal anomaly. But the chromosomal status of the baby was 
determined at conception and could be ascertained with close to certainty (see 
Austin et al. (2013) in this special issue) by means of a more accurate but also more 
invasive and risky diagnostic test. Although screening information is presented in 
terms of chance, the event in question has already happened, and the outcome in 
question is therefore determined. If personalised medicine had fulfilled the promises 
made for it, it would have allowed doctors to predict which patients would not benefit 
from a drug treatment by taking into account genetic markers. Unfortunately, failure 
to-date leaves patients in the arms of a metaphorical chance which offers merely a 
place-holder for the ignorance remaining when known correlates are allowed for, as 
expressed more accurately in statistical error terms. Completely accurate prediction 
would have totally banished probability, and therefore risk, from this domain. Even a 
reduction in the drug reaction error term would apparently diminish the role of 
chance. As the above examples illustrate, knowledge improvements per se appear 
to appear to diminish randomness, and this illusion is underpinned by the culturally 
sanctioned projection of uncertainty onto events.  
 
Probabilistic thinking based on inductive observation of historic frequencies can be 
dubbed ‘the probability heuristic’ to strip away its pretentions. It entails the operation 
of a whole set of usually unarticulated presuppositions: that members of a 
constructed event category can be considered equivalent (for example people with 
Down’s syndrome), allowing them to be sensibly counted; that all those to whom an 
identified and categorised risk factor applies ‘carry’ the observed aggregate rate of 
adverse event occurrence; that variations not predicted by selected risk factors result 
from randomness; and that the past provides a good guide to the future. For 
example, future life expectancies can only be estimated by observing the ages at 
which individuals died in the recent past. Actuarial calculations require some form of 
extrapolation, itself a leap of faith which can only be tested in retrospect. Calculation 
must be based on extrapolative assumptions of some sort, perhaps that the average 
age of death will stay constant, or that the rate of increase observed in most 
developed societies will continue at the same pace. Individuals can play the system, 
for example by controlling ‘their’ probability of dying before a particular age, although 
not unfortunately their age of death, by moving to an area with lower life expectancy 
so as to obtain a cheaper annuity! 
 
Heuristic acceptance of the ecological fallacy that an aggregate property of a 
constructed category, rates of occurrence, can be applied to individual members is 
built into probabilistic inductive reasoning, and thereby into a vast body of medical 
knowledge (Rose, 1981). Hunt (2003, p. 176) has noted a resulting ‘constant moving 
back and forth between individualizing and totalizing logics’ in risk analysis. 
Recognition of the prognostic usefulness of turning a blind eye to the ecological 
fallacy should not preclude acknowledgement of the irredeemable limitations which 
its acceptance entails. In relation to the social science of health risk, a particularly 
interesting issue opened up by this analysis is that of how service-users and 
professionals themselves variably understand and utilise inductive probabilistic 
reasoning, and navigate its shortcomings. The limited amount of relevant research 
which has been undertaken suggests that service-users may recognise multiple 
probabilities arising from differences in selection of risk factors and control 
information in order to manage ‘their’ probability of experiencing an adverse event 
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such as Huntingdon’s disease (Leontini, 2010); or may view membership of a higher 
risk category as itself a physical health problem (Heyman et al., 2006). The following 
quotation (Heyman and Henriksen, 1998, p. 183) illustrates the active management 
of ‘personal’ probabilities. 
 
And if I had the AFP [serum screening] test, that would let me know when it 
was a high risk or a low risk. And if it were a low risk, well, I could practically 
rule out having a Down's baby anyway. So that was brilliant anyway because 
that give me peace of mind. (Pregnant woman, 37 who had ruled out prenatal 
diagnostic testing and pregnancy termination) 
 
In this unusual and instructive case, the respondent had ruled out diagnostic testing 
for Down’s syndrome and pregnancy termination, but nevertheless opted for serum 
screening. In effect, she decided not to leave ‘her’ probability at the level associated 
with maternal age (1:150 at 16 weeks pregnant). The screening test would either 
reduce or increase ‘her’ probability, but she could not know in advance which of 
these prognostic outcomes would occur. The negative result lowered her chance of 
experiencing the adverse outcome in question to effectively zero, but a positive 
probability estimation, that is  one above the threshold at which diagnostic testing 
was recommended might have left her to worry for the remainder of her pregnancy. 
As the quotation also illustrates, probabilities mark out a level of chance with respect 
to a particular outcome above which a contingency should be treated as a cause of 
concern, and below which a risk is considered not to ‘exist’.  
 
Risk managers’ prognostic task can be more accurately characterised as uncertainty 
appraisal than as risk assessment (Aven and Guikema, 2011). However, the framing 
of professional practice within the broader culture of science, and the patient 
expectations which this framing encourages, work against such a tentative construal. 
A cultural affinity for the ‘“calculability” of consequences’ (Weber, 1978, p. 351) thus 
lays the foundations for the reification of risks and the tacit collective ‘deletion’ of 
uncertainty (Law, 1995). Official representations of probabilities often fail to 
acknowledge limitations of the research base from which they are derived such as 
the privileging of positive over non-significant findings in the publication process 
(Rakow et al., 2005). Further complexities arise in relation to the many options 
available to professionals for the communication of probabilities to service-users 
(Bowling and Ibraham, 2001), for instance as percentages, decimals to a base of 
one, or illustrative frequencies, and in terms of the chance of an adverse event 
happening or not happening. 
 
Probability and Moral Judgement 
 
Douglas (1990) argued that the development of probabilistic thinking was linked to a 
major change in social relations and institutions, with risk replacing sin as a key 
organising principle. She proposed that risk and sin perform similar functions, 
facilitating the allocation of responsibility for past events especially those such as 
disasters that threaten the social order; and that both offer means for predicting and 
managing future threats, providing guides for proper social action (Douglas, 1992). 
The shift from sin-based institutions to those framed by risk can been seen in the 
decline of the authority of religious experts who draw on sacred texts, and the 
corresponding rise of professional experts who use scientific knowledge to measure 
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risks. This shift is associated with a move from social relations underpinned by 
ascribed social status legitimated by divine authority to their grounding in contracts 
(Maine, 1861). There appears to have been a major change in the role ascribed to 
morality. Experts in sin-based institutions explicitly make value judgements about 
past and future actions, but those who operate in social systems grounded in risk 
appear to avoid overt moralising. Doctors are not expected to judge the moral 
character of their patients, but to minimise illness and prevent premature death 
(Parsons, 1991, p. 289). The claim to expertise of professionals is grounded in their 
technical knowledge of the probabilities of different outcomes and their ability to 
apply such knowledge to particular cases. The communication of such knowledge 
forms the basis of informed consent. On this view of the division of labour between 
the public and experts, the former calibrate the personal value of outcomes, and set 
their own levels of risk tolerance, but draw on the latter’s probability assessments. 
 
However, the present division of technical and moral work is not as clear-cut as it 
might appear. Closer scrutiny of actual practice, particularly at points of tension, 
indicates that there is a moral dimension to the use of probability. Probabilistic 
thinking contributes to the concealment of the moral dimension of social interactions, 
and plays an important part in the process through which moral problems are 
reframed as technical issues of risk management. There are situations in which 
professionals not only make judgements about probabilities, but also specify 
desirable outcomes, disregarding any preferences which patients or clients may 
have. Such situations arise when there is a clear societal pressure for certain 
outcomes and/or patients or clients are judged not to be capable of or willing to make 
a ‘rational’ and acceptable decision. In the present special issue, Heyman and his 
colleagues (2013) describe the ways in which staff in forensic units are required to 
prevent the patients they discharge from harming members of the public, 
backgrounding other risks such as the likelihood of such patients experiencing a 
poor quality of life in the ‘community’. Stanley (2013) notes the pressure on social 
workers to prevent parents from harming their children. Stanley (2013) argues that 
social workers deal with their anxieties by building up evidence that minimises 
uncertainty by confirming that, unless they take action, a child will be put at risk of 
being seriously harmed. In implementing this precautionary process, professionals 
downplay the harm that may result from a child’s removal from their family. Scamell 
and Alaszewski (2012) described a similar situation with respect to child-birth. They 
argue that since so much is at stake for professionally and personally for midwives if 
adverse events do occur that they focus on dreaded negative outcomes, effectively 
disregarding both the risks associated with medical interventions and  the high 
overall probability of births being normal. 
 
Even when patients are apparently treated as rational, autonomous decision-makers, 
it still possible to identify a moral dimension to the ways in which professionals use 
probability estimates. For example Williams and her colleagues (2002) concluded 
that experts involved in prenatal screening felt that parents had the right to 
information about the probabilities of foetal genetic abnormalities, because such 
knowledge enabled them to make informed choice, but not to information about the 
probable gender of a foetus if such information was to be used for gender selection. 
Similarly, Hallowell (1999), in a study of genetic counselling for hereditary 
breast/ovarian cancer, found that counselling was not neutral but prescriptive. 
Counsellors indicated to women that they had a responsibility to manage their risk in 
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particular ways, thereby guiding them to take a ‘responsible’ course of action, for 
example by ignoring risks which the counsellor considered to have too low a 
probability of occurring to be worth mobilising against. 
 
THE PAPERS IN THIS SPECIAL ISSUE 
 
The five papers included in this special issue are all concerned with the nature of 
probabilistic thinking, in health and social care. The papers focus at least as much on 
official as on ‘lay’ framings of uncertain expectations as probabilities. Austin et al. 
(2013) distinguish five distinctive medical decision-making contexts in which a test or 
other form of investigation is used to assess probabilities: with symptomatic and 
asymptomatic patients for a present condition; for a future health problem; for a 
supposed risk factor such as high cholesterol; and for a variety of conditions 
(‘shotgun testing’), for example commercial blood tests for a variety of purported 
genetic risk markers. Confusion between these contexts can lead to systematic 
errors in probabilistic inference which the paper charts. For example, screening for 
risk factors will be ‘oversold’ if they are conflated with the health problem of concern, 
and the often high probability that the former will occur without the latter is 
discounted. Similarly, interpretations of shotgun screening results will mislead if the 
increase in likelihood of false alarms resulting from multiple testing is ignored. Such 
confusions should not be considered as merely failures of expertise because they 
can be driven by societal processes, and by commercial and professional interests. 
 
The following three papers raise questions about probabilistic thinking with respect to 
serious offending against the person, in relation to child protection (Kearney, 2013; 
Stanley, 2013) and the discharge of patients from forensic mental health services 
(Heyman et al., 2013). In each case, the authors aim to pose questions about official 
probabilistic thinking itself, standing on its head the notion challenged by Douglas 
(1992) that members of the public are ‘weak’ on probability. Kearney applies to child 
protection practice the widely cited work of Kahneman, Tversky and co-workers 
(1982) into the systematic cognitive errors which ‘people’ make when reasoning 
about uncertainty. His starting point is the question of why non-accidental child injury 
or death is seen as highly probable despite its rarity, a phenomenon found 
particularly in the UK. Kearney argues that the findings of cognitive behavioural 
psychology, such as the power of the availability heuristic and the hindsight effect, 
are rarely applied to those who set child protection policy. He estimates, tellingly, 
that, that an ‘eye-watering’ 40,000 recommendations have been produced as a result 
of inquiries into non-accidental child deaths in England since 2003. Following media 
and political publicity concerning a single, horrific child murder, of Baby ‘P’, there 
were over 50,000 extra child protection referrals (Munro, 2010, cited in Kearney, 
2013). But Kearney estimates that the probability of a child identified by English child 
protection services being killed or accidentally injured is 0.025%, and concludes that 
few social workers will ever experience such an event directly or indirectly during 
their working life. Although their improbability makes these events almost impossible 
to predict, they are treated as ‘real’ risks which are entirely avoidable.  
 
The papers offered by Stanley (2013) and Heyman et al. (2013) are concerned with  
actual processes of probability assessment in child protection and forensic mental 
health services respectively. Stanley depicts a circular, self-reinforcing form of 
probabilistic reasoning in which the accumulation of records about a particular family 
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is used as an indicator in itself that a child is at increased risk of being harmed. 
Heyman et al. analyse the obscuring effect of prevention efforts on probabilistic 
inference, discussed in relation to  the discharge of offenders from secure forensic 
mental health services. The ‘inductive prevention paradox’ arises, they argue, 
whenever measures are taken to avoid or reduce the chance of an adverse event 
occurring, thereby cutting-off the supply of observational evidence needed for risk 
assessment. The paper focusses on the inevitably flawed strategies through which 
service providers attempt to see beyond the inductive prevention paradox, patients 
seek to influence assessments of their riskiness, and staff, in turn try to discount 
such self-presentational manoeuvres. 
 
The final research paper (Young et al., 2013) is concerned with the impact of media 
coverage on public perceptions of health risks. The authors confirm the findings of 
other studies that comparable conditions which receive greater media attention are 
assessed as more serious, more representative of disease, and also, perhaps 
surprisingly, less probable than those which are given less coverage. Their study 
contributes to this body of knowledge by comparing perceptions of population and 
personal probabilities of developing an infection. The authors conclude that a 
stronger correlation between these probabilities exists for diseases with lower as 
against higher media coverage than for those in which it is higher, ceteris paribus; 
and that this difference is reduced but not eliminated by the provision of further 
information. Thus, media exposure opens up a gap between perceptions of collective 
and personal probabilities, associated with ‘unrealistic pessimism’, that is a common 
belief that one is more likely to become infected than an average member of the 
population.  
 
In relation to probabilistic thinking, these findings can be linked to the constant 
alternation between totalising and individualising logics (Hunt, 2003) referred to 
above. This alternation arises from the crude, albeit useful heuristic epistemological 
status of probabilistic inductive inference from observed frequencies. Probabilities of 
this form, central to epidemiology, can only be quantified as aggregated rates for 
constructed categories, leaving unanswered the question of their applicability to 
individual category members. In turn, the non-specificity of such probabilities allows 
societal processes, particularly the unequal distribution of social power, to influence 
perceptions even of this apparently most factual element of risk-thinking (see the 




This special issue directs attention towards the place of probabilistic thinking in the 
‘lens of risk’. Induction from observed frequencies allows uncertainty about individual 
outcomes to be reduced, but only at the price of provisionally accepting the 
ecological fallacy. It must be assumed that all members of a category ‘carry’ the rate 
of occurrence observed across it, and that intra-category variations, such as which 
individuals do or do not develop a disease, result from random processes. The 
projective status of this presumed randomness can be easily demonstrated through 
consideration of examples where further information reduces or eliminates such  
unpredictability. The projection of uncertainty onto randomness generates 
superficially bizarre consequences such as multiple probabilities of the same single 
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event and the possibility of controlling ‘personal’ probabilities through information 
management. 
 
The research papers included in the special issue address a range of features of 
probabilistic thinking in health contexts, including non-obvious informational 
differences between types of screening, the distortions which can arise when 
probabilities are assessed in sensitive areas such as child protection and forensic 
mental health care, and the impact of the media on relationships between 
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i
 Perrow (1984) pointed out in relationship to the Three Miles Island accident that even a single 
occurrence of an event which experts predicted to be highly improbable alters collective perceptions 
of its probability of reoccurrence. Such thinking can be readily explained as use of the availability 
heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) because prior probabilities cannot be validly inferred from 
the occurrence of single events. 
ii
 An important implication of a philosophical Bayesian approach is that the distinction between 
probability and uncertainty is not epistemologically grounded in the difference between randomness of 
some phenomena as against ignorance about others (Winkler, 1996), the position taken by Hacking 
(1975, p. 13) who distinguishes ‘aleatory’ from ‘epistemic’ probabilities. Nor can it be accounted for in 
terms of probabilities, but not uncertainties, being quantifiable through the availability of a history of 
observations, a currently popular idea derived from Knight (1923). An alternative pragmatic rendition 
of the everyday uncertainty/probability distinction would bring in the attitude of the observer. 
Uncertainty language justifies delay in decision-making, e.g. in relation to global warming, whilst the 
language of probability contains the implicit imperative to decide one way or the other (Heyman et al., 
2010, pp. 87-89).  
